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INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court's recognition of the public trust
doctrine as an integral part of California's water rights system was one

Copyright Q 2012 Brian E. Gray. Professor of Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.

973

974

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 45:973

of the momentous events in the history of California (if not United
States) environmental policy.' The court looked back to the
foundational purposes of the public trust to hold that there are limits
to the sovereign power to privatize the rights to use the waters of the
state, and it looked forward to conclude that prudent development and
sustainable use of California's water resources require the state to
retain authority to protect the public trust for the benefit of all
Californians. The court also defined the public trust as an
environmental baseline that both protects the traditional interests of
navigation, commerce, and fisheries and embodies the contemporary
scientific and popular understanding that there are ecological limits to
the diversion and use of water for consumptive purposes.
The lessons of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court2 are now a
commonplace of water rights law, appearing not just in administrative
orders and judicial opinions, but also in standard water rights terms,
policy studies, and legislation. The concept of the public trust as an
environmental baseline has been fairly well integrated into the
regulation of water rights and the resolution of water resources
disputes. The lessons of Audubon have had less influence in the area of
water resources planning, however, where economic and political
pressures to expand existing water projects or to develop new sources
have tended to outweigh the demonstrated needs of the aquatic
ecosystems that are the sources of California's developed water
supplies.
In this Article, I describe the early cases that interpreted the public
trust doctrine following the California Supreme Court's Audubon
decision and then explain how the environmental baseline directives
of the public trust have been neglected in more recent planning
decisions that have profoundly influenced the administration of the
state's most important water resource - the Sacramento-San Joaquin
1 The court's decision came in the famous case of National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), in which the National Audubon Society and
other environmental organizations sued to enjoin the City of Los Angeles from
diverting water from four of the five tributary streams that provide Mono Lake with
freshwater. The plaintiffs alleged that the city's diversions were lowering the volume
of water in the lake and harming the public trust in a variety of ways, including
increased salinity (which threatened both the brine shrimp that inhabit the lake and
birds that depend on the lake for drinking water), diminishing public access and
navigation as the lake shore and surface area of the lake diminished, and reducing
wildlife as islands in the lake that served as nesting and roosting grounds became
connected to the mainland, which allowed access by predators. See id. at 713-16.
The history of the litigation is well told in JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: THE
MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE CALIFORNIA WATER FuTURE (1996).
2 Audubon, 658 P.2d at 709.
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River and Delta ecosystem. I conclude by proposing a decisionmaking
methodology that would better ensure that the public trust is more
seriously considered and better protected in all facets of California
water management.
I.

THE

1980 UC DAVIS PUBLIC TRUST CONFERENCE

This symposium commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the UC
Davis Public Trust conference is something of a personal journey. In
1980, 1 returned to California following a judicial clerkship and
stumbled into the recondite field of water law. My new law firm
represented the City and County of San Francisco in litigation involving
the Hetch Hetchy project, and I was assigned to these cases.' As a
student, I had studied neither environmental law nor water law.' I had
never seen Hetch Hetchy Valley (or, rather, the granite walls that now
envelop O'Shaughnessy Reservoir like a mausoleum), and I knew Mono
Lake only through occasional glimpses from the Yosemite high country.
Then the California Supreme Court granted review in the Audubon
litigation,' and suddenly I had to learn about the Roman and English
law of common resources, the doctrines of state title and equal footing,
and the public trust in California's navigable waters. We all did.
In its opening brief to the supreme court, the City of Los Angeles
asserted that recognition of the public trust as an integral part of
California's water rights system would jeopardize every major water
supplier in the state, including San Francisco.' Our client asked us to
research this claim, and the task fell to me as the junior member of the
team. Knowing little water rights law and nothing of the public trust, I
began my research by reading the cases cited by Los Angeles and the
other parties. As the supreme court later observed, however, these
One case was a dispute over the rates San Francisco charged for hydroelectric
power generated by the project. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. United Airlines, 616 F.2d
1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979). The other was a suit by the 30 cities and water agencies
that purchase water from San Francisco that claimed inter alia that Congress had
made them co-grantees of the Hetch Hetchy project. See City of Palo Alto v. City &
Cnty. of S.F., 548 F.2d 1374, 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1977). There are now two excellent
histories of the Hetch Hetchy project. ROBERT W. RIGHTER, THE BATTLE OVER HETCH
HETCHY (Oxford 2005); JOHN W. SIMPSON, DAM! WATER, POWER, POLITICS, AND
PRESERVATION IN HETCH HETCHY AND YOSEMITE NATIONAL PARK (2005).

' Indeed, I am not sure I had even heard the terms "water" and "law" used as a
conjunction.
Audubon, 658 P.2d at 708.
6 City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power's Return to Alternative Writ of
Mandate by Way of Answer to Petition at 71-74, Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. Mar. 11, 1981) No. 24368 (on file with the author).
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cases encompassed different strands of California law.7 The public
trust cases all addressed the physical use of the state's waters and
submerged lands, and most of them involved disputes over title to
coastal lands rather than inland waters.' The other set of cases
addressed various aspects of the water rights system' and, at least to
the uninitiated, presented a cacophony of competing principles priorities based on riparian and appropriative rights, different
priorities based on areas-of-origin and municipal preference, still
different priorities arising out of reasonable use, and so on.' 0
In those pre-LEXIS, pre-Westlaw days, I turned to the Legal
Periodicals Index and discovered two sources that I hoped would be of
some help. The first was Professor Joseph Sax's 1970 University of
Michigan Law Review article, which provided an intellectual and
historical foundation for reimagining the public trust as a principle of
environmental stewardship." The second was the 1980 UC Davis
symposium on The Public Trust in Natural Resources Law and
Management, in which I found several keys to unlocking the mysteries
of the public trust as it might be applied to California's water rights
system. 12

The UC Davis Symposium issue began with a list of five questions
posed by Professor Harrison Dunning, who had organized the public
trust conference:
First, is there a single "public trust doctrine" . . . [olr are there

several public trust doctrines perhaps depending on the
natural resource in question?
Second, is the public trust doctrine applicable to any natural
resource, or . . . [i]s the trust, in fact, merely a "tidelands

trust" as some have argued?
Third, what is the nature of the public trust? Does it involve
public property rights, or a specialized form of governmental
police power, or something else . . . ? Has the legislature the

power to terminate the public trust, and if so in what
circumstances?
See Audubon, 658 P.2d at 712, 726-27.
See id. at 718-24.
* See id. at 724-26.
10

See id. at 726-27.

" Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
" The Public Trust in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, 14
UC DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980).
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Fourth, what kinds of public uses of natural resources are
protected by the public trust doctrine? Must these uses
somehow be related to navigable waters?
Fifth, what are the implications of the public trust doctrine for
the managers of natural resources? Has the doctrine sufficient
content actually to influence day-to-day natural resource
management decisions? 3
Professor Dunning's questions presciently framed the California
Supreme Court's analysis of the public trust three years later in its
Audubon decision.
Inside the Symposium issue, I found a short article by Professor Sax
that suggested a methodology for recognizing and effectuating the
public trust in contemporary natural resources disputes." He urged
the courts and other decision-makers not to define the public trust in
a narrow, binary manner:
It is unreasonable to view the public trust simply as a problem
of alienation of publicly owned property into private hands,
since many -

if not most -

of the depredations of public

resources are brought about by public authorities who have
received the permission of the state to proceed with their
schemes. On the other hand, it is inconceivable that the trust
doctrine should be viewed as a rigid prohibition, preventing all
dispositions of trust property or utterly freezing as of a given
moment the uses to which those properties have traditionally
been put. It can hardly be the basis for any sensible legal
doctrine that change itself is illegitimate.15
Professor Sax concluded with a plea for accommodation of interests,
one that respects the historical foundations and ecological functions of
the public trust. He emphasized that
[olur task is to identify the trustee's obligations with an eye
toward insulating those expectations that support social,
avoidable
from
systems
ecological
and
economic
destabilization and disruption. Less acute intrusions should be
selected where feasible .

. .

. Where the alternatives include a

Harrison C. Dunning, Foreword: The Public Trust in Natural Resources Law and
1
Management, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 181-82 (1980).
" Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, 14
UC DAvis L. REV. 185 (1980).
15

Id. at 186.
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solution which will sustain yields and support longestablished human uses or biological communities, that
approach should be required.'"
The principal articles in the Symposium issue provided a valuable
overview of the public trust doctrine, tracing its development from the
ocean to tidal estuaries and wetlands to freshwater rivers and lakes
and onto dry land - a path akin to the evolution of the species. Jan
Stevens described the origins of the public trust in Roman law, the
English and American common law recognition of retained public
rights to use navigable waters and their submerged lands, and
California's incorporation of the public trust into its statutory and
constitutional law governing tidal lands." Ralph Johnson explored the
public trust doctrine as a means of ensuring the protection of
minimum stream flows and lake levels.' Professor Johnson began his
article with the assertion that the "public trust doctrine and the
appropriative water rights system are headed on a collision course in
the West."' 9 Charles Wilkinson concluded with a plea for greater use
of the public trust doctrine in federal public lands law, both as a guide
to judicial review of decisions that affect federal lands and natural
resources and as a means of spurring "active administrative protection
of resources that serve many different segments of the public."2 0
The article that proved to be of greatest use to this neophyte lawyer,
however, was Professor Dunning's exposition of The Significance of
California's Public Trust Easement for California's Water Rights Law."
Professor Dunning picked up where the principal articles left off and
traced the unique development of the public trust doctrine in
California law.22 More importantly, as the title of the article suggests,

Id. at 193.
" Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the
People's Environmental Right, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196-97, 199, 203-09 (1980).
18 Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14
16

UC DAVIS L. REV. 233 (1980).
19 Id. at 233.
20 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 UC

DAVIS L. REV. 269, 315 (1980). In a related article, my colleague John Leshy analyzed
claims by Nevada and several other western states that the United States has a trust
responsibility under the equal footing doctrine to transfer title to all non-reserved
federal lands to the states. John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law,
Politicsand Federal Lands, 14 UC DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
11 Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of California'sPublic Trust Easement for
CaliforniaWater Rights Law, 14 UC DAVIs L. REV. 357 (1980).
22 Professor Dunning identified three essential features of the public trust. First:
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he attempted to explain the relationship between the public trust and
California's water rights system. According to Professor Dunning, the
doctrine serves as an inherent limitation on the exercise of all water
rights, regardless of type or priority of right. "Conceptually," he
argued, "it is analogous to the public's right to be free of any public
nuisance which might be caused by the exercise of proprietary
rights."" This does not mean, however, that public trust uses always
take precedence over uses authorized by water rights. Rather, the state
and federal governments may modify, and in some cases terminate, the
public trust to facilitate development of California's waters for
consumptive purposes."
Professor Dunning also reasoned, however, that the common uses
protected by the public trust must be recognized even in those
watersheds that serve the state's water supply needs. He argued that "it
should not follow that, merely because the physical capacity exists and
water rights are recognized, a court must permit a project operator to
divert water from the basin to the full extent of the water rights."2 5
Professor Dunning concluded with a call for an accommodation of
water rights and the public trust in a way that adapts to contemporary
needs, both consumptive and in situ. Satisfactory resolution of these
questions, he wrote, "will require a high degree of judicial
craftsmanship, whether such resolution occurs in the Mono Lake
litigation or in some future lawsuit."26
With the insights gained from this education in the law, I persuaded
the San Francisco City Attorney to file an amicus curiae brief in the
Audubon case. We advised the supreme court that San Francisco did

[l]t springs from the ownership of land conferred on the State of California
upon admission to the United States .... Second, this property right serves
to limit subsequently created private property rights, so that exercise of the
public trust easement to the detriment of holders of those property rights
gives rise to no right to compensation. And finally, although clearly the state
may extinguish the public trust easement, such extinction requires more
than would be demanded for alienation of ordinary state property.
Id. at 364-65 (footnote omitted).
23 Id. at 383.
2 Id. at 389-96. Professor Dunning pointed to the water rights authority of the
State Water Resources Control Board and the United States' creation of the dams and
pumping facilities of the Central Valley Project as examples. Id.
25 Id. at 396.
26 Id. at 397.
27 Application of the City & County of San Francisco for Leave to File Brief as
Amicus Curiae and Amicus Curiae Brief, Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, No.
24368 (Cal. May 13, 1982) (on file with the author).
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not believe that incorporation of the public trust into the water rights
system would jeopardize its Hetch Hetchy project, and the city thus
became the only major water utility in the state not to oppose the legal
claims of the Audubon plaintiffs. The amicus brief rankled California's
close-knit water supply community, and neither San Francisco's good
standing nor mine has ever quite recovered.
I attended the oral argument at the California Supreme Court's San
Francisco courtroom and was privileged to watch a coterie of talented
attorneys explain the nuances of the public trust doctrine and
California's water rights laws. It was an active bench, with all seven
justices asking difficult questions. My enduring memory, though, is
the exchange between Justice Frank Richardson, the only Republican
appointee on the Court, and Adolph Moskovitz, lead counsel for Los
Angeles. Toward the end of his argument, Adolph asserted that "if
saving Mono Lake means so much to the State, let the State pay for it."
Justice Richardson replied: "Was Los Angeles paying the State all the
years it was taking the State's lake?"" Adolph later confided that,
when the only conservative justice on the Court put it that way, he
figured his chances of winning were not good.
II.

NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY V. SUPERIOR COURT

Two months after the Audubon oral argument, the California
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the public trust is an integral
part of California's water rights system and may serve to limit the
diversion of water where such diversions impair navigability, fisheries,
recreation, ecological services, and other in situ uses protected by the
doctrine.2 9 Justice Broussard's opinion of the court relied extensively
on the articles in the UC Davis Public Trust Symposium and, in most
significant respects, tracked Professor Dunning's analysis of the
28 Antonio Rossmann, Issues and Perspectives on California Water Rights
Law, 3
(quoting oral argument in Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
May 3, 1982) (No. 24368)), available at https://sunsite.berkeley.edu/WRCA/WRC/
pdfs/GW27thRossmann supp.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (supplementing March
10, 2009 written testimony before the California State Senate Committee on National
Resources and Water).
29 Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983). Justice
Richardson filed a dissenting opinion, but only as to the majority's conclusion that
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate public trust claims. In justice
Richardson's opinion, the State Water Resources Control Board would have exclusive
jurisdiction, and the court's role would be limited to judicial review of the Board's
public trust decisions. Justice Richardson joined the remainder of the Court's opinion,
including "its analysis of the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the
water rights system in this state." Id. at 733.
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relationship between the public trust doctrine and California's water
rights system. Among the court's conclusions were:
*

The public trust is both an aspect of the state's sovereignty
over its navigable waters and submerged lands and is a
limitation on all private property rights - including water
rights - acquired in those resources. This servitude
"prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to
appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests
protected by the public trust.""o

*

The public trust applies to all water rights, new and old,
and to water resources planning and other decisions
regarding the allocation and use of California's water
resources.3 1

*

Although the public trust protects navigable waterways,
the doctrine also applies to activities on non-navigable
tributaries that may affect public trust interests in the
downstream navigable river, lake, or estuary.

*

The state, acting through the Legislature or the State
Water Resources Control Board, has authority to grant
water rights that may harm public trust uses. In doing so,
however, the state must consider the effects of the
extractive water use on the public trust and provide some
measure of protection of the competing public trust uses."

*

The public trust is a component of the reasonable and
beneficial use mandate set forth in Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution. "All uses of water, including
public trust uses, must now conform to the standard of
reasonable use."34

I was elated with the supreme court's decision - especially its
declaration that "the public trust imposes a duty of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water" and its
recognition that "the state is not confined by past allocation decisions
which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent
30

31
32
33
3

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

727.
728.
720.
727-28.
725.
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with current needs.",3 These holdings brought water rights law more
squarely into alignment with the realities of water resources
management, which requires flexibility and responsiveness to changes
in hydrology, water quality, ecosystem functions, and fisheries, as well
as the evolving scientific understanding of these physical forces.36
Other aspects of Justice Broussard's opinion of the court were less
clear, however, and they left me with considerable skepticism about
the meaning and efficacy of the public trust. For example, the supreme
court articulated four distinct (and potentially conflicting) public trust
standards: protecting the public trust wherever feasible, protecting the
public trust when consistent with the public interest, an informal costbenefit analysis and balancing of interests, and the public trust as
merely one factor for consideration in water planning and allocation
decisions.
A. Feasibility
The first and strongest public trust standard created a substantive
mandate applicable to all aspects of water administration. The court
bluntly declared that "[tihe state has an affirmative duty to take the
public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible."" As
explored in more detail below, this standard was the only one
proposed by the court with the potential to provide meaningful
protection of public trust resources.
B.

Public Interest

The court's second characterization of the public trust mandate
came in the context of its discussion of the state's power to authorize
extractive uses of water that may harm in situ uses. "As a matter of
practical necessity," Justice Broussard wrote:
[Tihe state may have to approve appropriations despite
foreseeable harm to public trust uses. In so doing, however,
the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the
effect of the taking on the public trust . .. and to preserve, so

Id. at 728.
See ELLEN HANAK ET AL., MANAGING
RECONCILIATION 317-22, 371-73 (2011).
" Audubon, 658 P.2d at 728.
3

36

CALIFORNIA'S WATER: FROM CONFLICT TO

2012]

Ensuring the Public Trust

983

far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by
the trust."
This statement that the public trust is subsumed within the wideranging and amorphous public interest standard is troubling for two
reasons. First, it implies that the public trust is little more than a
reiteration of the statutory public interest test that governs the
California State Water Resources Control Board's ("SWRCB") water
rights jurisdiction." Second, it suggests that the public trust is simply
one of a multiplicity of factors that must be considered, and somehow
balanced, in decisions that allocate the rights to use the state's water
resources - factors that include the entire array of consumptive and
nonconsumptive uses.'
Id. (emphasis added).
" Section 1253 of the Water Code authorizes the Board to "allow the
appropriation for beneficial purposes of unappropriated water under such terms and
conditions as in its judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public
interest the water sought to be appropriated." CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2006).
Section 1255 reiterates this directive in the negative by stipulating that the Board
"shall reject an application when in its judgment the proposed appropriation would
not best conserve the public interest." Id. § 1255.
40As the Court of Appeal explained in the Delta Water cases:
38

The nature of the public interest to be served by the Board is reflected
throughout the statutory scheme. As a matter of state policy, water resources
are to be used "to the fullest extent . . . capable" (0 100) with development
undertaken "for the greatest public benefit" (§ 105). And in determining
whether to grant or deny a permit application in the public interest, the
Board is directed to consider "any general or co-ordinated plan . . . toward
the control, protection, development . . . and conservation of [state] water
resources . . ." (§ 1256), as well as the "relative benefits" of competing
beneficial uses (§ 1257). Finally, the Board's actions are to be guided by the
legislative policy that the favored or "highest" use is domestic, and irrigation
the next highest (§ 1254).
United States v. SWRCB, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal citations
are to the California Water Code). The Court also noted that environmental and other
in situ uses must be factored into the public interest calculus:
Nonconsumptive or "instream uses," too, are expressly included within the
category of beneficial uses to be protected in the public interest. Thus, the
Board must likewise consider the amounts of water required "for recreation
and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources" (0 1243)
and needed "to remain in the source for protection of beneficial uses,
including any uses . . . protected in any relevant water quality control plan . .

." (0 1243.5). Thus, when determining appropriative water rights, the Board
is expressly empowered to protect water quality as a matter of statewide
interest (§§ 1258, 13000 et seq.) and major environmental concern (PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000, 21001).
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Cost-Benefit Analysis and Balancing

Indeed, in its third formulation of the public trust the court
expressly stated that trust interests should be weighed or balanced
against the competing extractive uses of water. Justice Broussard
emphasized:
This is not a case in which the Legislature, the Water Board, or
any judicial body has determined that the needs of Los
Angeles outweigh the needs of the Mono Basin, that the
benefit gained is worth the price. Neither has any responsible
body determined whether some lesser taking would better
balance the diverse interests."
It is uncertain how a cost-benefit algorithm or less formal balancing
test would meaningfully weigh the diverse interests of urban and
agricultural water service, water supply reliability, flood control,
hydroelectric power generation, fisheries, recreation, aesthetics, water
quality, and ecosystem services that often compete for California's
scarce water resources. As Justice Scalia memorably observed in
criticizing efforts to balance dissimilar factors under the dormant
commerce clause: "[T]he scale analogy is not really appropriate, since
the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."4 2
Moreover, even if a common denominator could be found, a standard
that purports to balance these divergent interests would risk blending
the public trust into a broad pool of water allocation factors that the
SWRCB and the Regional Water Quality Control Boards already apply
in setting and implementing water quality standards for California's
rivers, lakes, and estuaries.43
Id. at 169-70 (except as noted, all internal citations are to the California Water Code).
" Audubon, 658 P.2d at 728.

Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters. Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988).
1 See CAL. WATER CODE § 13241 (Deering 2006) ("Each regional board shall
establish such water quality objectives in water quality control plans as in its
judgment will ensure the reasonable protection of beneficial uses and the prevention
42

of nuisance .

. .

. Factors to be considered by a regional board in establishing water

quality objectives shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, all of the following:
(a) Past, present, and probable future beneficial uses of water; (b) Environmental
characteristics of the hydrographic unit under consideration, including the quality of
water available thereto; (c) Water quality conditions that could reasonably be achieved
through the coordinated control of all factors which affect water quality in the area;
(d) Economic considerations; (e) The need for developing housing within the region.;
(f) The need to develop and use recycled water."). The SWRCB then must review and
approve the water quality plans adopted by the regional boards. Id. § 13245. The
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D. Consideration
The fourth standard offered by the supreme court would reduce the
public trust to merely a factor for consideration in water planning and
allocation decisions. In discussing Los Angeles's claims that
recognition of the public trust would undermine its capital
investments and reliance on the Mono Basin supplies and could force
the city to seek new water from alternative sources, Justice Broussard
wrote that "[sluch concerns must enter into any allocation decision.
We hold only that they do not preclude a reconsideration and
reallocation which also takes into account the impact of water diversion
on the Mono Lake environment."' Taken at face value, this standard
suggests that the pubic trust should function in a manner akin to the
National Environmental Policy Act" or the California Environmental
Quality Act," which require thorough consideration of environmental
effects, program alternatives, and mitigation, but ultimately do not
afford substantive environmental protection."
Although it is unlikely that the supreme court intended to create
this array of inconsistent standards for effectuating the public trust,
the court's failure to articulate a single standard (or at least a cohesive
set of standards) was confusing and threatened to diminish the public
trust. The four standards set out in the opinion invited litigants to
choose the one that would be most likely to promote their interests environmentalists favored the substantive feasibility test, while water
Board's review is also governed by the statutory directive to provide "reasonable
protection" or accommodation of all beneficial uses, which include "domestic,
municipal, agricultural and industrial supply; power generation; recreation; aesthetic
enjoyment; navigation; and preservation and enhancement of fish, wildlife, and other
aquatic resources or preserves." Id. § 13050(f); see also id. § 13000 ("The Legislature
. . . finds and declares that activities and factors which may affect the quality of the
waters of the state shall be regulated to attain the highest water quality which is
reasonable, considering all demands being made and to be made on those waters and
the total values involved, beneficial and detrimental, economic and social, tangible
and intangible.").
Audubon, 658 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added).
0 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4335 (West 2011).
46 CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (Deering 2006).
47 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1989)
("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process. If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately
identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that
other values outweigh the environmental costs."); Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990) ("CEQA does not, indeed cannot,
guarantee that these decisions will always be those which favor environmental
considerations.").
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users preferred the nonsubstantive, consideration standard - and the
SWRCB and lower courts were left to sort things out for themselves.
To compound this uncertainty, the court failed to identify which
party should bear the burden of proof in public trust cases. It made no
attempt to explain the relationship between the public trust and the
statutory laws that also protect lake levels, stream flows, navigability,
water quality, fish and wildlife, habitat, endangered species,
recreation, and other public trust uses."8 Moreover, as noted above, the
court also held that "[aill uses of water, including public trust uses,
must now conform to the standard of reasonable use" - apparently
subsuming protection of the public trust within the broader calculus
of article X, section 2 of the California Constitution." In short,
Audubon raised as many questions about the public trust doctrine as it
provided answers.

48 These laws include: the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (West 2011); the
Porter-Cologne Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 13241 (Deering 2006); the Endangered

Species Act, 16 U.S.C. H§ 1536, 1538 & 1539(a) (West 2011); the California
Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2080 (Deering 2006); and section
5937 of the California Fish and Game Code, id. § 5937.
4
Audubon, 658 P.2d at 725. The voters added article X, section 2 to the California
Constitution by initiative in 1928. The constitutional amendment changed California
water law in three fundamental ways:
First, it declared the doctrines of reasonable and beneficial use to be the
foundation of all water rights in California. Second, it stipulated that the
requirement of reasonable use could be asserted in all water rights disputes,
including those where an appropriator challenges a riparian use. Third, it
invested all branches of government with significant authority to implement
the mandates of reasonable and beneficial use.
supranote 36, at 39-40.
The California Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the reasonable use mandate
of article X, section 2:
HANAK,

[RIeasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of each case, [and]
such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide
considerations of transcendent importance. Paramount among these [are]
the ever increasing need for the conservation of water in this state, an
inescapable reality of life quite apart from its express recognition in the 1928
amendment.
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 864 (Cal. 2000) (quoting Joslin v.
Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967)).
For a detailed history of article X, section 2, see Brian E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot:
The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225 (1989).
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EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
FOLLOWING THE AUDUBON DECISION

As the years passed and several public trust claims made their way
to the SWRCB and the courts, my initial skepticism was allayed as the
Board and the courts carefully evaluated the relationship between the
public trust doctrine and California's water rights system, applying the
public trust doctrine to provide substantive protection for fisheries,
stream flows, water quality, and vital ecosystem functions. Three cases
were especially important to the early understanding of the public
trust as an environmental baseline against which new and existing
consumptive uses of water must be evaluated:
A.

The Lower American River Adjudication

The first case, Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal
Utility District (Lower American River), arose out of Environmental
Defense Fund's ("EDF") challenge to a contract between the East Bay
Municipal Utility District ("MUD") and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation for water service from the Bureau's Auburn/Folsom-South
Project, a unit of the Central Valley Project.o The contract called for
the diversion of 150,000 acre-feet of water annually from the
American River at Nimbus Dam for transport through the Folsom
South Canal to the Mokelumne River. East Bay MUD would then
redivert the water from its storage facilities on the Mokelumne for
domestic water supply throughout its service area in Alameda and
Contra Costa Counties. EDF claimed that these diversions would
harm recreational uses and water quality in the lower American River
between Nimbus Dam and the confluence of the American and
Sacramento Rivers. EDF argued inter alia that the diversions would
violate the reasonable use mandate of article X, section 2 of the
California Constitution and asked the court to order East Bay MUD to
divert water instead from the Sacramento River a few miles below the
confluence or from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta."
Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 2-5 (Cal. 1980).
* See id. at 2-4. EDF, Save the American River Association, and several other
parties filed the case in 1972, and the County of Sacramento later intervened as a coplaintiff. The California Supreme Court ruled in 1977 that the plaintiffs' claim that
East Bay MUD should be required to use reclaimed wastewater before it seeks new
diversions from the American River must be first presented to the SWRCB and that
the plaintiffs reasonable use claims were preempted by federal law. Envtl. Def. Fund v.
E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128, 1128, 1137 (Cal. 1977), vacated, 605 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1980). The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the federal preemption decision and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of California v. United States, 438 U.S.
5o
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On remand from the California Supreme Court, which held that the
courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the SWRCB to adjudicate
claims of unreasonable use of water, the case was assigned to Judge
Richard Hodge of the Alameda County Superior Court. Judge Hodge
referred the case to the SWRCB for fact-finding and preliminary
analysis of a variety of legal questions, one of which was the effect of
East Bay MUD's proposed diversions on public trust uses of the
American River. The SWRCB subsequently found that East Bay MUD's
diversion of 150,000 acre feet annually ("afa") "will not significantly
harm public trust uses of the lower American River" and that the
alternative point of diversion proposed by the plaintiffs was not as
feasible as diversion at Nimbus Dam." The Board also determined that
water diverted from the American River would be of higher quality
than water diverted from the Sacramento River or the Delta and thus
presented the lowest risk to public health of the three proposed
alternatives.53 in addition, it concluded that "the Folsom-South Canal
diversion point is not unreasonable, within the meaning of Article X,
section 2 of the Constitution.""
Following a trial de novo, Judge Hodge adopted a more nuanced
view of the public trust doctrine. He began by observing that the
public trust must be evaluated in conjunction with the constitutional
mandate of reasonable use." Judge Hodge then rejected both EDF's
contention that public trust uses have a priority over consumptive
uses and East Bay MUD's argument that the public trust is but one of
many factors that comprise the reasonable use calculus. He explained
that:
[w]ater quality cannot be excluded from the analysis simply
because it does not fit plaintiffs' and intervenors' conception of
645 (1978). Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun, Util. Dist., 439 U.S. 811 (1978). In its
1980 decision, the California Supreme Court held that the state law reasonable use
claims were not preempted and that the courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
SWRCB to adjudicate all unreasonable use claims other than those involving
reclaimed waste water. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 4-5 &
9-10 (Cal. 1980).
52 Statement of Decision, Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., No. 425955
(Alameda County Superior Court, filed Jan. 2, 1990), at 22 (quoting CAL. STATE
WATER RES. CONTROL BD., FINAL REPORT OF THE REFEREE IN THE LOWER AMERICAN RIVER
ADJUDICATION 11, 13 (1988)).

Id. at 23 (citing SWRCB Report, supra note 52, at 14-15).
Id. (citing SWRCB Report, supra note 52, at 17).
5
Id. at 26 ("Audubon demands that any such decision consider the requirements
of Article X, section 2 of the Constitution, along with the evolving public trust
doctrine.").
5

5
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a public trust value. Neither, however, can the importance of
the public trust be diluted by treating it as merely another
beneficial use under Article X, co-equal with irrigation, power
production, and municipal water supply."6
Rather, Judge Hodge reasoned, "In assessing appropriation values
versus public trust values, it is impossible to avoid a balancing
analysis.""
Yet, the key to balancing is not to lose sight of the public trust in the
effort to accommodate the competing uses. As Judge Hodge
emphasized:
The uses must be balanced or evaluated to determine whether
the fullest beneficial use of water has been achieved under
Article X section 2 . . .. The point of Audubon is that the Court

does not stop with that determination. Having determined the
"fullest beneficial use of water," the Court must still be
cautious to avoid needless harm to public trust values. And if
the harm to those values becomes significant, then the fullest
beneficial use of water may be precluded as a violation of
public trust. "

Judge Hodge then carefully considered the evidence on water
quality and protection of public drinking water supplies, as well as the
evidence of the likely effects of East Bay MUD's proposed diversions
on stream flows, fisheries, and recreational uses in the lower American
River." Based on this evidence, he fashioned a "physical solution" that
was designed to accommodate East Bay MUD's water supply, public
health needs, and the public trust. The physical solution included a set
of minimum flow standards (greater than those set forth in the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation's water rights permits for the project) and a
water storage reserve "for release upon the recommendation of the
[California] Department of Fish and Game in response to specific
fishery requirements."' Judge Hodge also appointed a special master
to monitor the efficacy of the physical solution and the parties'
compliance with the judgment.
The Lower American River decision was a milestone in the
understanding of the public trust in California for several reasons.

5

Id.
Id. at 29.

58

Id. at 30.

56

9 Id. at 49-82.
1 Id. at 109.
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First, it established that the public trust is more than simply a
procedural or "considerational" doctrine; it imposes substantive
obligations on both the state and federal governments and water users
to protect public trust resources. Second, Judge Hodge showed how
the public trust fits within the framework of article X, section 2 of the
Constitution. Although the public trust does not create a categorical
priority over other competing uses of water, it is more than merely one
factor within the reasonable use calculus. The public trust and
competing consumptive uses must be accommodated, where feasible,
to ensure that the waters of the state are allocated in the highest and
most reasonable manner. Third, the feasibility standard articulated by
the supreme court in Audubon does not mean that proposed extractive
uses of water must give way whenever there are feasible alternatives.
Rather, advocates of the public trust must show that it is necessary to
limit the extractive use to protect public trust resources. Fourth, the
physical solution doctrine - long a hallmark of California water
rights law 61 - is an essential component of the public trust. If a
physical solution can reasonably accommodate both the consumptive
and public trust uses, it must be employed. Finally, in some cases it
may not be possible both to allow the consumptive use and to protect
the public trust. Under these circumstances, if the consumptive use
threatens significant harm to public trust uses, the public trust may
take precedence - even at substantial cost to the consumptive water

user. 62
61 The California Supreme Court has long held that article X, section 2 "'compels
the trial court, before issuing a decree entailing such waste of water, to ascertain
whether there exists a physical solution of the problem presented that will avoid the
waste, and that will at the same time not unreasonably and adversely affect the prior
appropriator's vested property right.'" Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853,
869 (Cal. 2000) (quoting Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450 (Cal.
1936). For a detailed analysis of the physical solution doctrine in California water law,
see ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERic L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER II 172-86 (2d ed.
2007).
62 Judge Hodge offered the following example:

[WI ere it proven that the diversion of EBMUD water could be accomplished
at the Folsom-South Canal only by exterminating the fall run of salmon, and
with minimal health benefits to the consumer, the balance would shift
markedly in favor of plaintiffs. Substantial increase in expenditures of
accomplishing a Delta diversion, even to the extent of millions of dollars,
would not in such circumstances preclude the absolute protection of that
significant public trust value.
Statement of Decision, supra note 55 at 30. He called this hypothetical an "easy case,"
though it is markedly different from the facts of the actual litigation. Id.
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The Putah Creek Litigation

The second significant decision applying the public trust doctrine in
the aftermath of Audubon came in the Putah Creek Water Cases.63 The
plaintiffs sought an injunction that would require the Solano County
Water Agency ("SCWA") and Solano Irrigation District ("SID") to
restore flows in Putah Creek below the Putah Diversion Dam. SCWA
receives this water by contract with the Bureau of Reclamation and
provides water service through the Putah South Canal to agricultural
users within SID and to other cities and farms in Solano County. The
Bureau impounds the waters of Putah Creek in Lake Berryessa, which
is formed by Monticello Dam, and releases water as required by its
contract with SCWA. The plaintiffs claimed inter alia that the level of
diversions at the Putah Diversion Dam was inconsistent with the
public trust needs of Putah Creek and violated 5937 of the California
Fish and Game Code.64
The parties produced evidence on the hydrology of Putah Creek
before construction of Monticello Dam, the current state of the river,
the types and value of uses of the waters diverted into the Putah South
Canal, and the effects of those diversions on fish, recreation, and
aesthetic enjoyment of Putah Creek. Following the trial, Judge Richard
Park concluded that the existing level of instream flows below the
Putah Diversion Dam violated both section 5937 and the public trust
doctrine. Judge Park began his analysis with the finding that Putah
Creek
is a treasure. It is a home for birds, for wildlife, for waterfowl,
fishes, trees, and vegetation. It's an entire ecosystem in the
middle of a heavily farmed, agricultural environment. It's a

Reporter's Transcript of Judge's Ruling, Putah Creek Water Cases, Judicial
Counsel No. 2565 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. filed Apr. 8, 1996) [hereinafter
Putah Creek Water Cases]. This was a coordinated proceeding of two cases: the first
was brought by a local environmental group, the Putah Creek Council, the City of
Davis, and UC Davis against the Solano Irrigation District; the second suit was filed by
SID against all appropriative water right holders in the upper basin of the Putah Creek
watershed, which included the Solano County Water Agency. Id. at 1.
64 Id. at 13 & 19. Section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code provides:
63

The owner of any dam shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass
through a fishway, or in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to
pass over, around or through the dam, to keep in good condition any fish
that may be planted or exist below the dam.
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (Deering 2006).
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place for people to watch birds, [to] fish, to canoe, [and] to
kick back and enjoy the sights, sounds, and the smells.15
He also found that Putah Creek is "vital to the people of Solano
County."66 As the principal source of domestic water supply for the
cities of Vacaville, Fairfield, Vallejo, and Suisun City, it supplies
"cheap, reliable, and high quality water to the farmers of Solano
Irrigation District, contributing immeasurably to the economies and
agricultural production of the county."" Judge Park observed that the
"common thread that ties the public trust resources of Putah Creek to
the needs and interests of Solano County is obviously what this
lawsuit is all about -

water."

Although his analysis of the public trust was not as extensive as
Judge Hodge's in Lower American River, Judge Park nonetheless
reached several conclusions that advanced our understanding of the
doctrine. First, he acknowledged that the development of the water
resources of Putah Creek occurred during the period when the
overriding state and federal policies were to exploit fully California's
water resources and put them to economic use.69 Yet, despite the
reliance interests fostered by the old policies, Judge Park ordered the
consumptive users to give back some of their water because the overappropriation of Putah Creek had degraded public trust resources." In
doing so, he confirmed the California Supreme Court's holding in
Audubon that "[o]nce the state has approved an appropriation, the
public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking
and use of the appropriated water," and that in exercising this
authority, "the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which
may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with
current needs."7
65 Putah Creek Water Cases, supra note 63, at 2.

Id. at 3.
Id.
6
Id.
69 Id. at 13-14.
70 Id. at 14-15.
7' Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983). In an
illuminating meditation on the public trust and reliance interests, Judge Park
observed:
66
67

Public trust issues were not considered when this project was formulated,
authorized, built or placed in operation. If the water board knew then what
we know now, if it had heard what I heard for the past five weeks, I think I
can safely predict that there would have been a very different and very much
more generous release schedule. And frankly it's unfortunate that the
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Second, Judge Park recognized the functional relationship between
section 5937 and the public trust doctrine - that water released from
or bypassed by dams to support the fishery in the stream below also
serves public trust needs.n This insight strengthened the public trust
doctrine by showing that the common law doctrine often
complements governing statutory law. Integration of section 5937 and
the public trust would also be a feature of the SWRCB's resolution of
the Mono Lake controversy."
Third, consistent with Judge Hodge's opinion, Judge Park applied
the balancing and feasibility tests articulated in Audubon to provide
substantive protection to the public trust resources of Putah Creek.
Judge Park found that fish, recreation, water quality, and other public
trust interests in Putah Creek were suffering from the upstream
diversions, but he recognized that this alone was not sufficient to
justify a reallocation of water from the SCWA users to the river."
"National Audubon makes it clear," he wrote, "that public trust values
in theory can be sacrificed altogether if it is more appropriate under all
the facts and circumstances to allow a complete diversion of water to
Solano County."" Judge Park also found, however, that the SCWA
and its customers had feasible alternatives to the diversions they
would be required to forego to support additional stream flows in
Putah Creek.7 6 He noted that all the cities had current surpluses of
water and that future demands could be met through conservation and
water transfers. 7 Similarly, except during severe drought years, Solano
County farmers had received full water deliveries. During drought
periods, most farmers increased their pumping of groundwater,
eliminated double plantings, switched to less water intensive crops, or

process didn't take place then, because, if it had, it would have been easy to
live with. The Solano parties would have gotten what was offered to them
and no doubt would have been happy with it.
But coming 40 years after the implementation and operation of this project
any decision that lessens the amount of water delivered to Solano County is
obviously difficult for them to accept. In a sense I think the Solano parties
feel that this water belongs to them. They do call it project water. But I think
the law says it belongs to all of us.
Putah Creek Water Cases, supra note 63, at 13-14.
72 Putah Creek Water cases, supra note 63, at 5, 19-23.
1
See infra Part III.C.
" Putah Creek Water cases, supra note 63, at 19-20.
7 Id. at 13.
76 Id. at 14-15.
" Id. at 13.
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fallowed land and sold the conserved water to the cities or to the
Drought Water Bank. Judge Park concluded that "these potential
savings ... will cover the additional releases that I would be ordering
in this case." 79
C.

The Mono Lake Case

The third decision that helped to define the public trust doctrine
came in the Mono Lake case itself. Following the California Supreme
Court's decision in Audubon, the case returned to federal court, was
subsequently remanded to state court, later was consolidated with a
separate lawsuit challenging Los Angeles's diversions from the
tributaries of Mono Lake under section 5937, and ended up before the
State Water Resources Control Board for amendment of the city's
water rights licenses to ensure compliance with section 5937 in the
tributary streams and to protect the public trust in Mono Lake.80
7

Id. at 14-18. For a study of agricultural responses to the 1986-1992 drought, see

HAROLD 0. CARTER ET AL., SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING

(1994), availableat http://aic.ucdavis.edu/publications/oldanrpubs/scarcity.pdf.
* Reporter's Transcript, Putah Creek Water Cases, supra note 63, at 17. Although
the water users subsequently appealed Judge Park's decision, the parties ultimately
negotiated a settlement agreement. The agreement inter alia limits the amount of
water that may be diverted to serve consumptive uses within the Solano Project to
248,000 afa and establishes a minimum flow regime for Putah Creek below the Putah
Diversion Dam. Settlement Agreement and Stipulation Among Solano County Water
Agency, Solano Irrigation District, Maine Prairie Water District, Cities of Vacaville,
Fairfield, Vallejo, and Suisun City, and Putah Creek Council, City of Davis, and the
Regents of the University of California, Putah Creek Water Cases (2000) (on file with
author). The Bureau of Reclamation then petitioned the SWRCB to amend its water
rights permits for the Solano Project to recognize the water released from the project
to meet the stream flow requirements as an instream water right pursuant to section
1707 of the Water Code.
80 CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., MONO LAKE BASIN WATER RIGHT DECISION

1631 (1994) [hereinafter DECISION 1631]. The Board provides a brief summary of the
procedural history of the case following the Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 7-10. For
a more detailed history, see JOHN HART, supra note 1, at 108-75.
In the section 5937 litigation, California Trout, the Mono Lake Committee, and the
National Audubon Society brought suit to compel the SWRCB to rescind Los Angeles's
licenses to appropriate water from the tributary streams of Mono Lake because the
licenses were not conditioned on compliance with section 5937 as required by section
5946 of the Fish & Game Code. The Court of Appeal held that section 5937 applies to
the city's licenses and it ordered the Board to include a term in the licenses declaring
the city's water rights to be subordinate to the requirements of section 5937. Cal.
Trout, Inc. v. SWRCB, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191 (Ct. App. 1989). In a subsequent
decision, the Court directed the Superior Court to set interim flow standards for the
four steams from which Los Angeles diverts water. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court,
266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 803-04 (Ct. App. 1990).
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The Board conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing that included
analysis of a three-volume environmental impact report, computer
models of the Mono Lake ecosystem, and more than forty days of
testimony." This evidence covered a broad spectrum that evaluated
the state of the Mono Lake ecosystem before Los Angeles began its
water diversions; the effects of those diversions on fish, brine shrimp,
waterfowl, wildlife, air and water quality, navigability, recreation, and
other aspects of the public trust; the benefits and costs of alternative
levels of stream flow and lake level restoration; and Los Angeles's
water supply needs and alternative sources of supply, potential water
conservation.
Although the Board found that "there is no single lake elevation that
will maximize protection and accessibility to all public trust
resources," it ultimately settled on a restored lake level of 6,392 feet
above sea level, an increase of eighteen feet over the existing
elevation.83 The Board then amended Los Angeles's water rights
licenses to begin the long process of repairing the Mono Lake
ecosystem. It established minimum stream flow criteria for the
tributaries and prohibited the city from diverting any water that would
cause flows to fall below those standards." The Board also prohibited
Los Angeles from diverting any water until the level of Mono Lake

On remand, the case was transferred to the El Dorado Superior Court and assigned
to Judge Terrence Finney, who had recently completed the preliminary injunction
hearings in the Audubon litigation. in November 1991, Judge Finney ordered Los
Angeles to meet minimum flow standards in the tributary streams and to restore the
level of Mono Lake to an elevation of 6,377 feet above sea level. This judgment served
as a foundation for the SWRCB's subsequent amendment of Los Angeles's water rights
licenses. In re Mono Lake Water Rights Cases, Nos. 2284 and 2288 (El Dorado County
Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1989) (order granting preliminary injunction).
s1 See DECISION 1631, supra note 79, at 12-20.
82 Id. at 21-180.
Id. at 155. According to the Board:
[The] record indicates that an average water elevation of 6,392 feet would be
consistent with protection of a number of important public trust resources
including: air quality in the Mono Basin; water quality in Mono Lake; the
Mono Lake brine shrimp and brine fly which provide food for migratory
birds; secure, long-term nesting habitat for California gulls and other
migratory birds; easily accessible recreational opportunities for the large
number of visitors to the Mono Lake Tufa State Reserve; and the panoramic
and scenic views which attract many people to the Mono Basin.
Id.
84

Id. at 21-71, 156.

996

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 45:973

rose to 6,377 feet, with highly limited diversion rights during the
period in which the lake level was between 6,377 and 6,391 feet.85
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Mono Lake decision,
though, was the Board's analysis of the feasibility of Los Angeles's
compliance with the stream flow and public trust restoration
standards. The Board estimated that the minimum stream flow
requirements would reduce the city's water exports from Mono Basin
by an average of 35,200 afa.16 In addition, over the projected twentyyear period during which exports would be limited to restore lake
levels to 6,391 feet, it would lose an additional 35,700 afa."
Although these reductions comprised a staggering ninety-five
percent of Los Angeles's pre-Audubon Mono basin supplies, the
reduction in water exports was less than ten percent of the city's total
water supplies.88 The Board found that the city could make up this
deficiency through a combination of increased groundwater pumping,
purchases from the Metropolitan Water District, water conservation,
use of reclaimed wastewater, and water transfers." These alternative
sources would be considerably more expensive than the Mono basin
water, but the Board nevertheless determined that they were feasible
options." "Overall," the Board concluded, "the adverse water supply
impacts of this decision are overridden by the legal requirement to
provide flows to reestablish and maintain the pre-1941 fishery in the
four tributary streams, and by the benefits of this decision to fishery
and other public trust resources in the Mono Basin."'

Id. at 156-58.
Id. at 163.
87 Id. at 163.
8
Id. at 165-68.
8
Id.
90 Id. at 169-80. The SWRCB estimated that the increased cost of alternative water
supplies will be $27.8 million annually until the level of Mono Lake is restored to
6,391 feet, dropping to $17.9 million per year after that. Id. at 171-72. Los Angeles
also will lose approximately $8.5 million annually in foregone hydroelectric power
until the lake reaches the target elevation and $5.6 million annually thereafter. Id. at
178-80.
91 Id. at 178. In 1998, the SWRCB approved new stream restoration and waterfowl
habitat improvement standards for the tributaries. These standards included "stream
restoration flows" designed to cleanse the rivers of accumulated silt and debris and
better approximate the natural hydrographs of the tributaries. CAL. STATE WATER RES.
CONTROL BD., WATER RIGHT ORDER 98-05,
at 11-23 (1998), available at
http//www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/WaterRightOrders/WRO98-05.pdf Los Angeles
did not challenge either Water Right Decision 1631 or the subsequent water right order.
John Hart, supra note 1, at 173-75.
85
86
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Three aspects of the Mono Lake decision are especially significant:
First, the Board faithfully and rigorously applied the public trust
doctrine in a high stakes setting that pitted the state's largest city
against a natural resource that (unique and alluring though it may be)
is known to and visited by few Californians. Second, it took a broad
view of the feasibility and balancing tests by considering the
reallocation of Mono Basin water from Los Angeles to the ecosystem in
the wider context of the city's overall water supplies. Third, the Board
recognized the public trust as an ecological baseline that places
fundamental limits on diversion of water for consumptive uses. All are
essential embellishments of the California Supreme Court's
articulation of the public trust in Audubon.
IV.

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE PUBLIC TRUST

Following these early decisions, the SWRCB asserted the public
trust doctrine proactively to protect public trust resources from new
appropriations and, retrospectively, to repair rivers that had been
degraded by water diversions. The most important prospective
application of the doctrine was the Board's stipulation that all new
appropriative rights are subordinate to the in situ needs of the public
trust. Thus, the Board now includes in all permits and licenses a
standard term that conditions the right to appropriate water on
compliance with the public trust and declares that the "continuing
authority of the SWRCB also may be exercised by imposing further
limitations on the diversion and use of water by the permittee [or
licensee] in order to protect public trust uses.""
The most prominent retroactive application of the public trust
doctrine following the Mono Lake decision came in the Board's 2001
reconsideration of the water rights of the Yuba County Water Agency
("YCWA") and other appropriators of water from the Yuba River.9 3
Following a lengthy set of hearings and negotiations, the Board
established new minimum stream flow standards and temperature
requirements to protect chinook salmon, steelhead, and American

92 Standard Permit and License Terms, CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD.,
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water-issues/programs/permits (last updated
May 11, 2011). The standard permit term for the public trust is Term 12. For licenses,
the standard term appears in the license template. These standard terms are authorized
by California Code of Regulations title 23, section 780(a).
9
CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER RIGHT DECISION 1644: FISHERY
RESOURCES AND WATER RIGHT ISSUES OF THE LOWER YUBA RIVER (2001) (revised in 2003

in accordance with SWRCB Order WR 2003-16).
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Shad in the Yuba River below YCWA's Englebright Dam.94 The Board
relied heavily on the public trust doctrine, as well as article X, section
2 of the California Constitution, to amend the water rights of YWCA
to implement the new fishery protection standards and to reject claims
that the water users were entitled to compensation for lost revenues
that would result from the changes in their water rights. Consistent
with the foundational cases discussed above, the Board also engaged in
a "feasibility/balancing" analysis to conclude that YCWA and the other
appropriators would not be unreasonably burdened by the reoperational changes needed to protect the fish. The Board also applied
section 5937 to bolster its public trust determinations.96
These were salutary developments because they institutionalized the
role of the public trust doctrine in the SWRCB's water rights
administration. The Board's increasing use of the public trust also
persuaded me that the doctrine could play a significant role in water
resources management that augmented the statutory laws that protect
stream flows, water quality, fish and wildlife, habitat, endangered
species, recreation, and other instream uses.
V.

THE PUBLIC TRUST AND WATER RESOURCES PLANNING

Despite these advances, more recent water management decisions
have caused some of my initial skepticism about the efficacy of the
public trust to return. As the cases described in parts III and IV
demonstrate, the SWRCB and the courts have generally applied the
public trust doctrine in a manner that recognizes its fundamental
purpose of ensuring that extractive uses of the state's water resources
do not unduly and unnecessarily degrade the ecosystems that are the
sources of those developed supplies. In contrast, the major decisions
that have dominated California's water management and planning over
the past fifteen years have not been so faithful to the Supreme Court's
9

Id. at 35-86.

" See id. at 30-31, 139-42.

Id. at 100-31, 142. Because of uncertainty about the effects of the new flow
standards on hydroelectric power production at YCWA's New Bullards Bar and
Englebright Dams, the SWRCB set interim standards in both its 2001 and revised 2003
decisions. Id. at 125-127. In 2008, the Board made the flow standards permanent. CAL.
STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., REVISED WATER RIGHT ORDER 2008-14, at, 56-63
(2008). In that same order, it also authorized YCWA to transfer up to 200,000 afa to
the State Water Project from 2008 through 2025. Id. at 59. (YCWA previously made a
series of short-term transfers to the SWP for use in the Environmental Water
Account). Through these annual transfers, YCWA may recoup some of the economic
benefits of the water that it must release from its reservoirs to comply with the
streamflow and standards set forth in Decision 1644. Id. at 44-45.
96
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directive that "[t]he state has an affirmative duty to take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources,
and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible."97 Yet this
prospective feature of the public trust is just as important as its
remedial aspects because, with careful planning that is cognizant of
public trust resources, we can avoid the mistakes of the past in which
so many of the state's rivers have been over-appropriated and its
aquatic ecosystems needlessly diminished.98
Unfortunately, though perhaps not surprisingly, the most glaring
failure to account adequately for the public trust in water resources
planning has occurred in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta
system. This failure has happened despite explicit promises to place
protections and sustainable use restrictions of the Bay-Delta ecosystem
on par with consumptive uses that divert water from the system.
Indeed, in each of the most recent efforts to establish long-term
standards to protect this critical source of California's developed water
supplies, the public trust has either been relegated to a factor of
secondary importance or is at risk of being subsumed within a broader
water allocation calculus that is likely to prefer the consumptive uses
that impound, divert, and export water from the system over the
sustainable ecological needs of the estuary.
A.

The CALFED Bay Delta Program

The CALFED Bay-Delta Program arose out of the protracted and
fitful efforts to protect water quality, endangered species, and other
instream uses of the Bay-Delta system, while also allowing for the
diversion of water -

both from and upstream of the Delta -

for

municipal, agricultural, industrial, and other consumptive uses." The
waters of the Bay-Delta system are vital to California's population and
economy.10 0 Along with so many of California's rivers, lakes, and
" Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
98 See HANAK ET AL., supra note 36, at 19-134, 183-251.
9 For an overview of the regulatory efforts to protect water quality and
endangered species in the Bay-Delta estuary that preceded the CALFED program, see
State Water Res. Control Bd. cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 203-10 (Ct. App. 2006); see
also Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 341, 343-49 (1996). The Little Hoover Commission's 2005 analysis of
the failings of CALFED also includes a useful history. LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION,
STILL IMPERILED, STILL IMPORTANT: THE LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE
CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM 1-10 (2005).

'oo Currently an average of 5.9 million acre-feet of water is exported south
each year from the Bay-Delta, of which about 60 percent is taken for
agriculture and the remainder for urban uses. Two-thirds of California
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estuaries, however, the impoundment and diversion of water from the
system has strained the ecosystem to the point of near collapse.'o' As
the California Supreme Court has described:
[11n 1994, against a backdrop of the mounting concerns over
water shortages, the ecological deterioration of Bay-Delta
estuary, the decline in water quality, and the risk of levee
system failure, eight state agencies and 10 federal agencies
with management or regulatory responsibility over the BayDelta formed CALFED to develop a long-term solution to the
Bay-Delta's problems.102
The mission of the CALFED program was "to develop a long-term
comprehensive plan that will restore ecological health and improve
water management for beneficial uses of the Bay-Delta system."'o3 To'
achieve these dual purposes, CALFED stated that it would take "a
broad approach to addressing the four problem areas of water quality,
ecosystem quality, water supply reliability and levee system integrity,
recognizing that many of the problems and solutions in the Bay-Delta
system are interrelated."1 ' For the first three categories, it specifically
pledged to:
Provide good water quality for all beneficial uses.
Improve and increase aquatic and terrestrial habitats and
improve ecological functions in the Bay-Delta to support
sustainable populations of diverse and valuable plant and
animal species.

households receive at least some of their domestic water from the Bay-Delta,
and over seven million acres of highly productive land are irrigated from the
same source.
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184
P.3d 709, 715 (Cal. 2008).
11'"Conflicting
demands have resulted in several resource threats to the BayDelta: the decline of wildlife habitat; the threat of extinction of several native
plant and animal species; the collapse of one of the richest commercial
fisheries in the nation; the degradation of Bay-Delta water quality; the
continued land subsidence on Delta islands; and a Delta levee system faced
with a high risk of failure."
Id.

(quoting CALFED BAY-DELTA

PROGRAM,

FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, Technical App., Phase II Report at

11(2000)).
1o2 Id. at 717.

I
104

CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 9 (2000).

Id. at 10.
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Reduce the mismatch between Bay-Delta water supplies and
current and projected beneficial uses dependent on the BayDelta system. 105

The stated goals of the program were admirable - to correct the
long-standing imbalance between extractive and instream uses of the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Rivers and Delta, to repair and restore
ecosystem integrity, and to develop a long-term plan for the
sustainable use of the waters of the system to support the panoply of
consumptive and nonconsumptive beneficial uses. Indeed, the simple
articulation of CALFED's mission as embodying both water supply
and ecological restoration was a cause for great optimism as it
represented a sharp break from the previous policies that, for many
decades, had promoted water development to the almost complete
exclusion of water quality, fisheries, aquatic habitat, and ecological
health. The high hopes that I and many others had for CALFED were
short-lived, however, as the program moved decisively to make water
supply reliability its paramount consideration.
This shift occurred early on, during the Phase I scoping process,
when CALFED eliminated from further consideration any program
alternative that did not include increasing the amount of water
exported from the Delta. 106 CALFED explained that it would evaluate
only those alternatives that would allow the Central Valley Project
("CVP") and the State Water Project ("SWP") to increase their exports
of water from the Delta because "an alternative that would achieve
water quality objectives by reducing or capping exports would prevent
the CALFED Program from achieving its objectives regarding water
supply reliability.""o' As a result of this decision, although CALFED
1I
106

Id. at 9.
CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

at CR-30 (2000).
Id. The CVP is owned and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. As
described by the California Supreme Court:
STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT,
10'

The CVP operates 21 reservoirs, 11 power plants, and 500 miles of major
canals and aqueducts. With total storage capacity of more than 12 million
acre-feet, the CVP delivers approximately seven million acre-feet of water
annually through the Delta-Mendota Canal to over 250 water contractors,
primarily for agricultural use in the Central Valley and adjacent areas.
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184
P.3d 709, 716 n.1 (Cal. 2008). The SWP is owned and operated by the California
Department of Water Resources. As described by the California Supreme Court:
The SWP consists of a series of 21 dams and reservoirs (including Oroville
Dam and Lake Oroville on the Feather River, a tributary of the Sacramento
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prepared two drafts and a final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement/Environmental Impact Report during Phase II, it did not
evaluate any alternative that included limiting or reducing future
exports of Delta water.'08
Although contradictory to CALFED's mission statement of
developing a long-term program that will both "restore ecological
health and improve water management for beneficial uses of the BayDelta system," this decision could be characterized as simply a
judgment call for CALFED to make in narrowing the scope of a
complex programmatic EIS/EIR. Indeed, the California Supreme Court
upheld CALFED's choices for precisely this reason. 109 CALFED also
serves, however, as a cautionary tale of the consequences of
undervaluing the public trust in long-term water planning.
CALFED recognized that the environmental flow and water quality
requirements - as well as the state and federal laws that protect fish
and other aspects of the ecosystem - might not allow for an increase
in CVP and SWP exports."o Yet the CALFED agencies chose to
River), five power plants, 16 pumping plants, and 662 miles of aqueduct; it
exports Bay-Delta water through the California Aqueduct.
Id. at 716 n.2. The coordinated operations of the CVP and SWP are the largest
contributor to the problems of water quality, flow reduction, flow alteration, and
fisheries decline that have perplexed California water administrators for the past four
decades. See id. at 717.
10"The final PEIR evaluated four water conveyance alternatives, each with an
assessment of "additional storage up to 6 million acre feet ... and without additional
storage," as well as a "no action" alternative that CALFED used as a basis for
comparison of the program alternatives. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note
106, at ES-7. All of the alternatives called for an increase in the CVP and SWP exports
over the next 30 years to meet the projected demands of California's growing
population. Id.
CALFED selected as its "preferred alternative" a program that includes significant
dredging and improvements to the channels of the Delta to permit more efficient
transport of water from the Sacramento River basin to the CVP and SWP pumps in the
south Delta; possible future construction of a 10,000 cfs capacity conveyance canal
that would divert water from the Sacramento River and convey it directly to the
eastern interior channels of the Delta; construction of salinity barriers in the south
Delta to keep San Joaquin inflow from the south Delta pumps; creation of an intertie
between the CVP and SWP facilities and a joint point of diversion; installation of new
fish screens; and construction of as much as 6 million acre feet of new surface and
ground water storage upstream of the Delta and as off-stream storage near the Delta
and in the San Joaquin Valley. Id. at 2-16 to 2-18.
1"
In re Bay-Delta ProgrammaticEnvtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184
P.3d at 718, 731-32.
110For example, the Programmatic EIS/EIR states that:
All of the CALFED Program actions will need to comply with applicable
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disregard these facts and refused to consider any alternative that
would have evaluated a capped or reduced exports scenario."' In turn,
this decision to ignore the acknowledged risk that increased exports
from the Delta could violate water quality, instream flow, and
endangered species requirements led in short order to exactly those
consequences.
The CALFED Record of Decision, issued in 2000, set the stage for
an increase in CVP and SWP pumping from the Delta."' For example,
the 2004 Operating and Criteria Plan ("OCAP") for the coordinated
operation of the projects provided for a 27% to 54% increase in
regulatory programs. Most potential surface water storage projects being
evaluated by CALFED will need to comply with, among other things, the
requirements of the state and federal ESAs, the SWRCB's Clean Water Act
Section 401 certification program, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
Section 404 permit program.
CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 106, at CR-65. Notably absent from this list

is the public trust, which is fully applicable to the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and
Delta system. See United States v. SWRCB, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 200-02 (Ct. App.
1986).
n. In comparing the water supply and management consequences of the five
alternatives included in the Programmatic EIS/EIR, CALFED acknowledged that under
the "no action" alternative:
Annual Delta exports could decrease by as much as 570 TAF or could
increase by as much as 370 TAF over the long-term period. Reductions in
annual Delta exports would result from more protective Delta water
management criteria .... During dry and critical years, annual Delta exports
could decrease by as much as 610 TAF or could increase by as much as 130
TAF.
CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, supra note 106, at 3-8 (emphasis added). Although

CALFED planned for increased exports under each of the four program alternatives, it
estimated that without construction of additional storage the change in exports from
the "no action" levels would range from increases of 140,000-590,000 afa in most
years to a possible decrease of 30,000-90,000 afa in dry and critical years. Id. In other
words, CALFED recognized that the consequences of future implementation and
enforcement of the environmental laws in the Bay-Delta system could be a net
reduction from current levels of exports by as much as 430,000 afa during most years
and as much as 700,000 afa in dry and critical years. Id.
Even under the preferred alternative, CALFED predicted that without additional
storage "annual long-term period Delta exports would increase 250-380 TAF ... over
the No Action Alternative" - a possible net decrease of 320,000 afa from existing
export levels. In dry and critical years, the preferred alternative (without storage)
could result in a net decrease in exports from current pumping levels of as much as
560,000 afa. Id. Indeed, in its responses to public comments, CALFED candidly stated:
"Exports could be reduced or increased under the PreferredProgramAlternative compared
to existing conditions." Id. at IA-5.1-15 (emphasis added).
112 See HANAK ET AL., supra note 36, at 60, 63-64.
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exports from the south Delta pumps." 3 By the latter part of the
decade, Delta flows and water quality had been further diminished,
salmon and Delta smelt were on the brink of extinction, and the two
projects were in violation of the very laws that CALFED had predicted
might limit their exports of water from the system. In 2006, the
SWRCB issued a cease and desist order against the CVP and SWP
based on the Board's determination that project operations violated
salinity standards in the south Delta."' The following year, Judge
Oliver Wanger of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California concluded that the biological opinion that approved the
2004 OCAP was inadequate to protect the Delta, and he ordered the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to revise it. 115 Judge Wanger
subsequently determined that the biological opinion designed to
protect salmon and steelhead from coordinated CVP and SWP
operations also was inadequate and, he directed the National Marine
Fisheries Service to revise it as well." Indeed, the California
Department of Water Resources has estimated that future compliance
with endangered species requirements will reduce SWP exports from
the Delta "virtually every year in the future (93% of future years).
These reductions would amount to a 20% reduction from current
levels about one-fourth of the time, and greater than 30% in one-sixth
of future years." ' 7
Although these regulatory decisions established a post hoc
environmental baseline of sorts, emergency remedial action is not an
adequate substitute for fidelity to the public trust in the initial water
planning decisions that -

if incorrectly structured -

may irreparably

113 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332 (E.D.
Cal. 2007).
114 Draft Cease and Desist Order Nos. 262.31-16 & 262.31-17, 2006 WL 451949,
at *10 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Feb. 15, 2006). The Board ordered the
projects inter alia to consider a variety of corrective actions, including a "reduction in
exports" from the Delta. Id. at *18.
115 Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88.
116 Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1193-94 (E.D. Cal. 2008). In more recent opinions, Judge Wanger invalidated the
biological opinions for both the Delta Smelt and the salmonid species inter alia based
on his conclusion that the USFWS and NMFS did not adequately consider the
economic effects of their decisions. See In re Consol. Salmonid Cases, 1:09-CV-01053
OWW DLB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109012, at *428 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011); In re
Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 1:09-CV-00407 OWW DLB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98300,
at *194 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011).

117

CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., SUMMARY: DRAFT STATE WATER PROJECT DELIVERY

RELIABILITY REPORT

2007, at 1 (2008).
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harm public trust uses."' Yet CALFED's failure to protect the public
trust in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta ecosystem is not
surprising as CALFED paid scant attention to its public trust
obligations. CALFED did evaluate the effects of present and future
water exports on water quality and fisheries under the guise of its
mission statement to "restore ecological health and improve water
management for beneficial uses of the Bay-Delta system."119 But it did
so in a manner that always made the public trust subordinate to the
goal of improving the reliability of water service to those parts of the
state that rely on exports upstream of or from the Delta.
In marked contrast to the early cases that established the public
trust in California water resources law - Lower American River, Putah
Creek, and Mono Lake - CALFED did not ask whether public trust
uses require additional water and, if so, whether it would be feasible to
reallocate water to serve the public trust. Rather, CALFED addressed
these questions in reverse order. It concluded that the water exporters
needed more water, and it found that capping or reducing Delta
exports would be infeasible and therefore not worthy of consideration
as a means of ensuring the health of the ecosystem.
Ultimately, CALFED's failure to account for and to protect the
public trust in water resources planning caused it to fail in both of its
mission goals. It adopted a program that would neither restore
ecological health nor improve water management. Instead, the
CALFED program gave legal sanction to water management decisions
that have further degraded the ecosystem, jeopardized the species that
depend on the ecosystem for their critical habitat, and exacerbated the
"' In upholding CALFED's decision to ignore the identified risks that the
environmental needs of the Bay-Delta ecosystem might well require additional water,
the California Supreme Court did note:
Bay-Delta ecosystem restoration to protect endangered species is mandated
by both state and federal endangered species laws, and for this reason water
exports from the Bay-Delta ultimately must be subordinated to
environmental considerations. The CALFED Program is premised on the
theory, as yet unproven, that it is possible to restore the Bay-Delta's
ecological health while maintaining and perhaps increasing Bay-Delta water
exports through the CVP and SWP. If practical experience demonstrates that
the theory is unsound, Bay-Delta water exports may need to be capped or
reduced.
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184
P.3d 709, 726 (Cal. 2008). This is a useful acknowledgment of the realities of remedial
regulatory practice, but it would have been preferable for the Court to have
recognized the benefits of informed, proactive water management.
us CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 9 (2000).
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uncertainties and unreliability of the water supplies that are drawn
from the ecosystem.
B. The Aftermath of CALFED
In the wake of the CALFED debacle, the state undertook two new
efforts to shore up the reliability of California's water supplies while
better protecting the aquatic resources of the Delta ecosystem. In
2006, former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger created the Delta
Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force. 120 Three years later, the Legislature
enacted the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act.121 Both of
these initiatives offered new hope for protecting the public trust in the
waters of the Delta ecosystem.
1. Delta Vision
In his executive order creating the Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task
Force, Governor Schwarzenegger directed its seven members to
develop a strategic plan "for sustainable management of the Delta's
multiple uses, resources and ecosystem."1 22 He defined sustainabilty in
this context as management of the Delta "over the long term to restore
and maintain identified functions and values that are determined to be
important to the environmental quality of the Delta and the economic
and social well being of the people of the state."l 23 The strategic plan
for the Delta revealed that the Task Force regarded its work as a
reaction to CALFED's failings. As the Delta Vision Task Force advised
the Governor:
The Delta has been the subject of decades of study and
political deadlock. As a consequence, ecosystems have eroded,
levees have deteriorated, fish populations have collapsed, and
our system of delivering water has become ever more
precarious.
The disparate interests with a stake in the Delta have
attempted for years to reach agreement on the Delta's future.
Those efforts, most recently the CALFED process, have failed.

120 GOVERNOR'S DELTA VISION, BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 67-70

[hereinafter

FINAL REPORT].
121 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 85000-85350 (West
2011).
122 GOVERNOR'S DELTA VISION, FINAL REPORT, supra note
123

Id.

119, at 69.

(2007)
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This Task Force is keenly aware of that history and the peril
California faces from continued failure.124
The Task Force recommended a series of reforms that included:
restoration of the "Delta ecosystem as the heart of a healthy estuary";
promotion of "statewide water conservation, efficiency, and
sustainable use"; construction of additional water storage and
conveyance facilities; and creation of a "new governance structure
with the authority, responsibility, accountability, science support, and
secure funding to achieve these goals." 125 The Task Force also called
for state law and policy to recognize "the co-equal goals of restoring
the Delta ecosystem and creating a more reliable water supply for
California."12 These goals, it explained, are co-equal "because one
objective can't be achieved without the other." 2 ' Then, to emphasize
its differences from CALFED (which also, of course, had stated that
restored ecological health and improved water management were its
twin mission goals), the Delta Vision Task Force declared:
The co-equal goals must be fully institutionalized in California
policy making; commitment to achieving them cannot be
124 GOVERNOR'S DELTA VISION, BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE, STRATEGIC PLAN, at i
125 Id. at 23.

(2008).

Id. at vii.
Id. at v-vi. As the failure of CALFED showed, it is not possible to enhance the
reliability of water supplies from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta system
without restoring and ensuring the ecological integrity of the Bay-Delta estuary - at
least without repealing the various environmental laws that protect water quality and
endangered species. Whether it is possible to restore the ecosystem without creating a
reliable water supply is less obvious.
The Task Force recognized, however, that California will continue to rely on
exports of water from the system to support existing and future consumptive uses
throughout the state and that improvements in storage and conveyance, as well as
changes in water management, are needed to protect the ecological integrity of the
system. Thus, in explaining its conditional (and qualified) support for a canal or
tunnel to move water from the Sacramento River to the south Delta pumps, the Task
Force stated:
126
127

As a central protection of that reliability, the Task Force recommends,
subject to further analysis, a two-channel approach-improving the existing
channel through the Delta and a second channel designed for conveyanceto carry water to export pumps. Increased storage capacity, surface and
ground, plus changed operations are also required to improve water supply
reliability. Concurrently, Californians need to become less dependent on
water supply from the Delta, both to reduce risk from a failed Delta
conveyance system and to reduce risks to the ecosystem. A revitalized Delta
ecosystem will require reduced diversions at critical times.
Id. at vi.

University of California,Davis

1008

[Vol. 45:973

discretionary. To this end, the goals should be reflected in the
state's constitution, its statutes, and its financing structures.
That way, policy makers have the authority, responsibility,
and long-term revenue stream necessary to accomplish the
goals. In addition, the water contracts, water rights permits,
and operational agreements that drive much of the day-to-day
management of the Delta should also contain stipulations that
recognize the co-equal goals. 128
Finally, the Task Force noted that the "reasonable use and public
trust principles of the California Constitution provide a strong legal
foundation for weighing water demands and uses."' 29 The Delta Task
Force's recognition that the public trust might actually play a role in
the resolution of California's most important and vexing water conflict
was a vast improvement on CALFED's neglect (if not abnegation) of
the public trust.'
2.

The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009

The Delta Vision strategic plan had a profound influence on the
legislation that became the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act
of 2009.1" The Act followed the Task Force's recommendation and
declared that the waters of the system shall be managed to achieve the
co-equal goals of "providing a more reliable water supply for
California and protecting, restoring, and enhancing the Delta
ecosystem. "132 It also created a Delta Stewardship Council charged
with developing a Delta Plan that inter alia will "[riestore Delta flows
and channels to support a healthy estuary and other ecosystems";
128

Id. at 57.

129 GOVERNOR'S DELTA VISION, FINAL REPORT,

supra note 119, at 3-4. The Delta Task
Force's characterization of the public trust is not quite accurate, as it is a common law,
rather than constitutional, doctrine.
1' The Delta Vision Report and Strategic Plan were transmitted to the Delta Vision
Committee, which was comprised of the Secretary for Resources, the Secretary for
Environmental Protection, the Secretary for Business, Transportation and Housing,
the President of the California Public Utilities Commission, and the Secretary for Food
and Agriculture. The Committee adopted most of the Task Force's recommendations,
including the concept of co-equal goals, which the Committee concluded should be
enacted into state law. DELTA VISION COMM., IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 1-6 (2008).
1' CAL. WATER CODE H§ 85000-85350 (West 2011).
132 Id. § 85054. In recognition of the dynamic nature of ecosystems, as well as the
scientific understanding of those systems, the Legislature also stated that the "coequal
goals shall be achieved in a manner that protects and enhances the unique cultural,
recreational, natural resource, and agricultural values of the Delta as an evolving
place." Id.

Ensuring the Public Trust

2012]1

1009

improve water quality to meet drinking water, agriculture, and
ecosystem goals; restore and protect habitat and migratory corridors;
"promote statewide water conservation, water use efficiency, and
sustainable use of water"; and "promote options for new and improved
infrastructure relating to the water conveyance in the Delta, storage
systems, and for the operation of both to achieve the coequal goals." 3 3
The Act also reiterated that the "longstanding constitutional principle
of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the foundation
of state water management policy and are particularly important and
applicable to the Delta."13 1
These legislative mandates - and the Delta Stewardship Council
charged with implementing them - hold great promise for more
ecologically sensitive and sustainable management of the SacramentoSan Joaquin River and Delta system. They give equal status to
ecological integrity of the system and the competing consumptive
demands that have brought the system to its current state of crisis.
They require more efficient and more creative management of the
state's developed water resources. And they correct a fundamental
failing of past efforts to protect the system by expressly directing that
the public trust and reasonable use doctrines be the guiding principles
for all future water allocation, use, and planning decisions.
C.

The Public Trust and Future Water Resources Planning

The Delta Vision Task Force's advocacy of the public trust and the
Legislature's restoration of the public trust doctrine to its essential
position in the water resources planning process are likely to be seen
as milestones in the history of California water policy. Yet there
remains some cause for concern that these reforms may not adequately
protect the essential needs of the ecosystem and effectuate the
mandates of the public trust.
The first concern, of course, is the history of frustration and failure
in Delta management and planning - a history that includes a
multitude of litigation, political stalemate, regulatory failure, and most
recently CALFED." If past is indeed prologue, there is a significant
risk that future efforts to protect the public trust in the Sacramento-

113 Id. H§ 85200-85204, 85300-85304. The Delta Plan will guide all state and local
actions that may affect the Delta. Id. § 85300(a). The Delta Stewardship Council also
has authority to review decisions and plans of state, regional, and local agencies to
ensure that they are consistent with the Delta Plan. Id. § 85225-85225.30.
134 Id. § 85023.
135 See HANAK ET AL., supra note
36, at 59-65.
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San Joaquin River and Delta system will give way to the continued
demands placed on the system by California's municipal, industrial,
and agricultural water users.
Second, it is not clear how the "co-equal" goals of providing a more
reliable water supply while also protecting, restoring, and enhancing
the Delta ecosystem will be achieved. As Judge Hodge observed in his
Lower American River opinion, although the public trust does not
necessarily take precedence over competing uses, neither "can the
importance of the public trust be diluted by treating it as merely
another beneficial use under Article X, co-equal with irrigation, power
production, and municipal water supply."' 36 In other words, the legal
concept of "co-equality" presents a significant risk that water
managers and regulators will blithely balance consumptive and public
trust uses against each other - though giving them equal weight in
the balancing calculus - and come to an allocation decision that
accommodates both without adequately ensuring the essential baseline
of a sustainable ecosystem. Indeed, two recent water planning
analyses - both involving the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and
Delta system - provide early evidence that policymakers will
interpret "co-equal" in precisely this manner.
1. The Bay Delta Conservation Plan
The Bay Delta Conservation Plan ("BDCP") negotiations are a
multiparty effort to craft a "a comprehensive conservation strategy for
the Delta designed to restore and protect ecosystem health, water
supply, and water quality within a stable regulatory framework."' 37
The plan will serve as a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP") under
section 10 of the federal Endangered Species Act 3 . and as a Natural
136 Statement of Decision, Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., supra note
52, at 26.

BAY DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN STEERING COMM., PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BAY
DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BDCP, at 1-1 (Jan. 2012)
137

(working draft). The BDCP participants include the federal and state agencies with
jurisdiction over the waters of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta system,
upstream and in-Delta diverters, environmental groups, and other interested
constituencies. Id.
13
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2006). An HCP is an agreement between the federal
agencies charged with administering the Endangered Species Act - the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service - and water users whose
project operations may "take" an endangered or threatened species. The purpose of
the agreement is to define the conditions under which the water users may impound
or divert water without jeopardizing the protected species or adversely altering its
critical habitat. An HCP also may authorize the water users to "take" a specified
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Community Conservation Plan ("NCCP") under California law.13 The
plan also will define how the CVP and SWP must be operated to
comply with the state and federal endangered species acts, and it will
form the basis for new biological opinions governing project
operations.14 In addition, the BDCP will coordinate the regulatory
standards imposed by other laws, including the Clean Water Act, the
Porter-Cologne Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the
California Environmental Quality Act, and the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009."'
The BDCP process would appear to be an ideal forum, not only for
developing a comprehensive conservation planning strategy to help
achieve the co-equal goals of water supply reliability and ecosystem
restoration, but also for effectuating the public trust in the Bay-Delta
estuary. The early reviews, however, are not promising.
At the request of the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Commerce, the National Research Council ("NRC") evaluated the
BDCP working draft and concluded that it is deficient in several
respects, including omission of San Francisco Bay from the Bay-Delta
ecosystem, failure to synthesize the scientific studies of the
multiplicity of stressors on the ecosystem, inadequate explanation of
the requirements of adaptive management, and the absence of
recommendations to address the fragmented and incoherent nature of
water management in the Bay-Delta system."' Most germane to the
analysis of the public trust, though, are what the NRC panel called the
BDCP's failure to conduct an "effects analysis" and the lack of clarity
about the BDCP's fundamental purpose.' These criticisms focused on
number of the species without violating the statute. See Littleworth & Garner, supra
note 61, at 151-53.
139 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800-2840 (West 2011). An NCCP is similar to an
HCP. It is an agreement between the California Department of Fish and Game and
water users whose actions may "take" a species listed under the California Endangered
Species Act. The purpose of the NCCP is to provide for the management and
conservation of the species habitat for the protection of the species, while also
allowing for the impoundment and diversion of water for consumptive uses. An
NCCP also may include incidental take authorization. Littleworth & Garner, supra
note 61, at 159-60.
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BDCP, supra note 138, at 1-12.
'40
141 Id. at 1-10 to 1-16. The 2009 state legislation authorizes the Delta Stewardship
Council to include the BDCP in its own Delta Plan. CAL. WATER CODE § 85320 (West
2011).
142 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A REVIEW OF THE USE OF SCIENCE AND ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA'S DRAFT BAY DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN 2-6 (2011) (prepublication copy).
'43 Id. at 18-24.
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the BDCP's decision to recommend construction of a forty-five mile
subterranean pipeline that would convey water from the Sacramento
River under the Delta to the CVP and SWP pumping plants in the
south Delta."*
The NRC panel observed that, although the BDCP had extensively
described the species that inhabit or migrate through the Bay-Delta
estuary, it limited its analysis of the adverse effects on these species
and their habitat to those potentially caused by the proposed new
conveyance facility. The BDCP draft:
[T]hus presupposes the choice of the project to be permitted.
By contrast, a broadly focused conservation strategy, which the
BDCP draft also say it is, requires a similarly broadly focused,
comprehensive analysis. Such an effects analysis would
include a systematic analysis of the factors affecting species
and ecosystems of concern and the likely contribution of
human-caused changes in the system. Such an analysis would
then lead to the informed choice of options for reversing the
decline of the ecosystem and its components, rather than only
analyzing a pre-chosen option. 45
In the opinion of the NRC, this inadequate effects analysis stemmed
from the BDCP's vague definition of its mission. As noted above, the
BDCP is a forum for negotiating an HCP and NCCP as required to
authorize the "incidental take" of protected species under the federal
and state Endangered Species Acts. But, it also is a process for creating
"a comprehensive conservation strategy for the Delta designed to
restore and protect ecosystem health, water supply, and water quality
within a stable regulatory framework."' 6
The NRC panel observed that if the BDCP's purpose is simply to
devise a plan that will allow the taking of protected species as an
incidental consequence of future CVP and SWP operations, then its
early selection of a new Delta conveyance facility is legally justified.
Under this scenario, the tunnel and pipeline would be the proposed
project, and the HCP/NCCP would be the means by which its effects
See BAY DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN STEERING COMM., PROGRESS REPORT ON THE
BAY DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BDCP, at 4-14 to 4-19 (Nov.
2010) (working draft). In the draft reviewed by the NRC, the BDCP Steering
Committee described this "tunnel/pipeline conveyance facility . . . as the new BDCP
conveyance approach to allow for dual operations of the new north and existing south
Delta diversions." It noted, however, that "it has not been decided if the conveyance
facility would be a tunnel/pipeline or, alternatively, a canal facility." Id. at 4-14.
145 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 142, at 21.
146 PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BDCP, supra note 138, at
1-1.
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on protected species would be evaluated. If the BDCP purports to have
the broader purpose of formulating a comprehensive management
plan for the Bay-Delta system, however, then the early focus on a new
Delta conveyance facility skews and perverts the environmental
analysis. The NRC panel explained:
To obtain an incidental take permit, it is logical to identify a
proposed project or operation and design conservation
methods to minimize and mitigate its adverse effects. But if the
BDCP were largely a broader conservation program, designed
to protect the ecosystem and provide a reliable water supply,
then a more logical sequence would be to choose alternative
projects or operating regimes only after the effects analysis was
complete. Under that scenario, choosing the alternative first
would be like putting the cart before the horse, or post hoc
rationalization; in other words, choosing a solution before
evaluating alternatives to reach a preferred outcome.14
As described below, the decision-making sequence employed by the
BDCP also violates the public trust.
2.

The SWRCB Flow Criteria Report

The second piece of evidence for my concern that the public trust
may be shortchanged in future water planning and allocation decisions
is illustrated by the SWRCB's establishment of flow criteria as required
by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The Act
states that the Board "shall, pursuant to its public trust obligations,
develop new flow criteria for the Delta ecosystem necessary to protect
public trust resources."' 4 8 It requires the Board to "use the best
available scientific information" and directs that the flow criteria "shall
include the volume, quality, and timing of water necessary for the
Delta ecosystem under different conditions."149
The Board's analysis, which included consultation with the
preeminent scientists in the fields of hydrology, fisheries biology, and
ecology, is the most sophisticated and complete study of the public
trust needs in the Bay-Delta system.' It confirmed that the decades of
'

supra note 143, at 4; see id. at 22-23.
§ 85086(c)(1) (West 2011).

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,

'"
CAL. WATER CODE
149 Id.

150 CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., DEVELOPMENT OF FLOW CRITERIA FOR THE
4 (2010) [hereinafter FLOW CRITERIA

SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ECOSYSTEM
REPORT]. Although the Board looked broadly

at the array of public trust interests, it
focused on fisheries, water quality, and ecosystem services. Id. at 4-7.
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over-appropriation of water have taken a severe toll on the resources
of the ecosystem. For example, the Board found that "[riecent Delta
flows are insufficient to support native Delta fishes for today's
habitats."' 51 It noted that "[tihe effects of non-flow changes in the
Delta ecosystem, such as nutrient composition, channelization,
habitat, invasive species, and water quality, need to be addressed and
integrated with flow measures," 1 52 but it also determined that the "best
available science suggests that current flows are insufficient to protect
public trust resources."153 The Board bluntly concluded that
restoration of "environmental variability in the Delta is fundamentally
inconsistent with continuing to move large volumes of water through
the Delta for export.""
The Board then set about to correct this problem, stating that inflow
from the Sacramento and San Joaquin River systems into the Delta
must be increased to support a healthy and sustainable Bay-Delta
ecosystem. "In order to preserve the attributes of a natural variable
system to which native fish species are adapted," the Board determined
that the flow criteria should include:
*

75% of unimpaired Delta outflow from January through
June;

*

75% of unimpaired Sacramento
November through June; and

*

60% of unimpaired San Joaquin River inflow from
February through June.15

River inflow

from

Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
153 Id. at 2.
" Id. at 6. The Board also highlighted that the water quality needs of consumptive
and instream beneficial uses of the waters of the Delta may be in tension with one
another: "The drinking and agricultural water quality requirements of through-Delta
exports, and perhaps even some current in-Delta uses, are at odds with the water
quality and variability needs of desirable Delta species." Id.
"' Id. at 5. The SWRCB stated that other criteria include: "increased fall Delta
outflow in wet and above normal years; fall pulse flows on the Sacramento and San
Joaquin Rivers; and flow criteria in the Delta to help protect fish from mortality in the
central and southern Delta resulting from operations of the State and federal water
export facilities." Id. It added that the criteria "should reflect the frequency, duration,
timing, and rate of change of flows, and not just volumes or magnitudes." Id. The
Board also declared that the "[i]nflows should generally be provided from tributaries
to the Delta watershed in proportion to their contribution to unimpaired flow unless
otherwise indicated." Id.
151

152
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These flow criteria represent a significant increase over the fifty
percent average unimpaired inflow and outflow that exists under
current levels of aggregate diversions.1 6
The flow criteria were controversial, and the Board was careful to
note that "none of the determinations in this report have regulatory or
adjudicatory effect. Any process with regulatory or adjudicative effect
must take place through the State Water Board's water quality control
planning, water rights processes, or public trust proceedings in
conformance with applicable law." 5 1 When it sets flow criteria with
actual regulatory effect, the SWRCB continued, it "reviews and
considers all the effects of the flow objectives through a broad inquiry
into all public trust and public interest concerns."5 8 These include
non-fisheries' public trust resources, as well as "a broad range of public
interest matters, including economics, power production, human
health and welfare requirements, and the effects of flow measures on
non-aquatic resources (such as habitat for terrestrial species)."' The
Board also stated that it "does not make any determination regarding
the feasibility of the public trust criteria and consistency with the
public interest in this report."' 60 And there's the rub.
The vital question for the Delta ecosystem will be how the Board
discharges its ultimate obligation to establish flow criteria with
regulatory effect under the public trust, reasonable use, and public
interest standards. The Board correctly recognized that the public trust
does not trump other uses of the waters of the Sacramento-San
Joaquin River and Delta system - neither as a matter of law nor in
light of the realities of current and projected future demands that rely
on the Delta for their water supplies. This is consistent with the
California Supreme Court's holdings in Audubon that the SWRCB "has
the power to grant usufructuary licenses that will permit an
appropriator to take water from flowing streams and use that water in
a distant part of the state, even though this taking does not promote,
and may unavoidably harm, the trust uses at the source stream"61 and
that "[a]ll uses of water, including public trust uses, must now
conform to the standard of reasonable use."'

156
1'

158
159
160
161

162

Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983).
Id. at 725.
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While the Board must evaluate the public trust in conjunction with
the competing demands on the resource, it must weigh and
accommodate public trust and extractive uses in a careful sequence
that (1) identifies public trust needs, (2) analyzes the effects of the
extractive uses (usually water impoundments, diversions, and
alteration of flows) on the public trust, (3) evaluates the uses that are
served by the diversions of water, and (4) determines the feasibility of
altering or limiting the extractive uses to provide reasonable
protection for public trust requirements. The risk posed by a less than
careful application of the public trust doctrine is that trust uses and
consumptive uses will simply be weighed and balanced against each
other in a vague decision-making calculus that inevitably will prefer
water supply reliability over the documented and now compelling
needs of the Delta ecosystem.
This risk is highlighted by the perfunctory, if not sanguine, response
of the Delta exporters to the SWRCB's Flow Criteria Report - a
response based in large part on the Board's assurances that any future
application of the public trust to the Bay-Delta system would include a
"balancing of public trust values and water rights."' The reaction of
Tom Birmingham, General Manager of the Westlands Water District,
is emblematic. "The information certainly is interesting and
informative," he said, "but it's immaterial. Protecting the public trust
resources are not the only goals of the planning processes.""
This facile balancing of the public trust against other important
goals is cause for concern because the temptation to encroach on the
public trust in furtherance of the countervailing goal of security of
water supply will always be great. Regulation and planning that give
equal weight to these goals - that starts with the presumption that
both are at play and that environmental baseline requirements and
water supply needs can be balanced and accommodated in the public
interest - will tend to resolve scientific uncertainties, policy
judgments, and questions of water rights in favor of the latter. This is
the lesson of CALFED, the BDCP, and the other previous efforts to
protect in situ uses of water in the Bay-Delta system.

163

FLow CRITERIA REPORT, supra note 151, at 3.

m1 Kelly Zito, Study: Cut in Delta Water Use Needed for Fish, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug.

4, 2010, at A-1.
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A MODEST PROPOSAL

To minimize this risk that the public trust will be lost or diminished
at the outset, I offer a modest proposal - one that is based on the
wisdom of Lower American River, PutahCreek, and Mono Lake.
The SWRCB first should establish water quality, stream flow,
temperature, and other criteria as required to protect public trust uses.
These would be similar to the Flow Criteria Report described
previously. As with the lake elevation level and other standards
established in the Mono Lake case, these criteria would not necessarily
provide full or ideal protection for all public trust uses. But they
would be set at levels that, based on the best available science, would
assure the survival and propagation of fish and maintain essential
ecosystem services and integrity. Borrowing from section 109 of the
Clean Air Act,6' these criteria also would include an "adequate margin
of safety" to ensure that changes in hydrology, uncertainties in the
science, problems with monitoring and enforcement, and other
variables do not encroach upon the vital needs of the ecosystem.
These criteria would serve as the environmental baseline for all
water resources planning, permitting, and enforcement. The water
needed to fulfill this environmental baseline would effectively be set
aside and excluded from the water available for impoundment,
diversion, and use by all water right holders. This set-aside would be
incorporated into, and place ecosystem protection limits on, the
operation of existing water projects and the planning of future water
resources development.
Planning agencies such as CALFED would be required to ensure the
protection of defined public trust needs before they propose new
projects or advise existing water users on the quantity of water
available to support existing or proposed increases in impoundments
and diversions. Environmental protection initiatives such as BDCP
and the Delta Stewardship Council would be similarly bound to
ensure protection of the public trust in determining how much, and
under what conditions, water may be diverted from the ecosystem.
Regulatory agencies such as the SWRCB and the Regional Boards
could grant permits, establish water quality standards and flow
requirements, and apportion responsibility for meeting those
requirements only after determining that their actions would not
encroach upon or interfere with the achievement of the defined public
165 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006) (directing Environmental Protection Agency to
establish ambient air quality standards that, "allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisite to protect public health") (emphasis added).
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trust requirements. And the courts would follow the lead of Judges
Hodge and Park and recognize the public trust as an environmental
baseline that limits the rights of consumptive users in water rights
adjudications.
Therefore, as their first responsibility, all agencies with authority
over California's waters must adhere to and ensure the protection of
the defined public trust needs of the ecosystem. The only lawful
exception to this directive would be based on a finding that it would
be infeasible to fulfill the environmental baseline in individual
circumstances. The burden of proof would be placed on the agency (or
the proponents of the new project or existing water use) to
demonstrate that:
1. The needs of the competing
compelling;

consumptive uses are

2. There are no other reasonably available and affordable
sources of supply, including transfers, conjunctive
management, and use of reclaimed waste water; and
3. The water right holder and its derivative users have
deployed all reasonable conservation measures to
minimize their demands on the resource.
This decision-making structure, or something similar to it, is
essential to ensuring meaningful protection of the public trust in
future water resources regulation and planning decisions.
CONCLUSION

The distinguished fisheries biologist Peter Moyle has concluded
that, despite all of our laws and administrative efforts - water quality
standards established under the Porter-Cologne Act,' 6 the Endangered
Species Act,'"' section 5937 of the California Fish and Game Code,'16
Environmental Protection Agency vetoes and intervention under the
Clean Water Act,' 69 the Central Valley Project Improvement Act,170
166 CAL. WATER CODE §H 13000, 13050(j), 13140-13148 (West 2011); see SWRCB
cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 207 (Ct. App. 2006); United States v. SWRCB, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 200 (Ct. App. 1986). For a summary of the SWRCB's struggles to protect
water quality in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta system, see HANAK ET
AL., supra note 36, at 59-62.
167 16 U.S.C. H§ 1531, 1539 (2006); see HANAK ET AL., supra note 36, at 61-62.
168 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 2011).
169

See HANAK ET AL., supra note 36, at 61.

170

Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706
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CALFED'n, the Delta Reform Act,"' the BDCP,"1 and the public trust
among them - "the fish are losing." 14 As recently reported by
Professor Moyle and others:
Of 129 kinds of native fish in California, 5 percent are extinct,
24 percent are listed as threatened or endangered species, 13
percent are eligible for listing today, and another 40 percent
are in decline . . . . In other words, over 80 percent of the

native fishes are extinct or imperiled to a greater or lesser
degree.' 75
In addition, all runs of salmon, steelhead, delta smelt and its relatives,
sturgeon, and striped bass are at perilously low levels because of dams,
water diversions, flow alteration, pollution, destruction of wetlands,
and other human causes."'
After reviewing these dismaying statistics, Professor Moyle usually
adds: "People always ask me, 'How much water do the fish need?' And
they ask that because they usually want to take all the rest." He means
this as a criticism of our existing water policies, but I have come to
think of it as the best way of thinking about the public trust.
If there is any prospect of preserving our remaining fish species and
restoring the integrity of the aquatic ecosystems on which they depend
for their survival, then we must first decide how much water the fish
need. Second, we must mean it; we must effectively set this water aside
and insulate it from new and existing diversions. And third, we must
structure our water planning, water allocation, and water rights
enforcement decision-making to ensure that we protect the water
needed to fulfill the ecological baseline that the public trust embodies.
If we do not make these changes to ensure that the public trust is
meaningfully considered and actually protected in California's future
water resources management, we are likely to see California's stream
flows, fisheries, and aquatic ecosystems continue to decline "past
hope, and in despair, that way past grace. "177

(1992). For a brief description of the CVPIA and California water policy, see
AL., supra note 36, at 62.
171 See supra Part V.A.

HANAK ET

§§ 85000-85350 (West 2011).
See supra Part V.C.1.
17 HANAK ET AL., supra note 36, at 200.

172

CAL. WATER CODE

17

176

Id.
Id. at 200-06.

177

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CYMBELINE, act 1, sc. 1, in The Riverside Shakespeare:

17

The Complete Works 1571 (2d ed. 1997).
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